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Abstract 
Traffic analysis is a process of great importance, when it comes in securing a network. 
This analysis, according to the needs of our network, can be classified in different le-
vels. One of these levels and the most analytical of them all is Deep Packet Inspection 
(DPI). DPI is a very effective way of monitoring the network, since it performs traffic 
control on the majority of the OSI model’s layers (from L3 to L7). In our case, this DPI 
implementation is done by using Snort, an open sources Network Intrusion Detection 
and Prevention System (NIDS) program. Snort, currently, is making use of the Boyer-
Moore algorithm, which is a software-based approach to the DPI packet filtering.  
Snort will be, also, needed for writing rules that are using Regular Expressions (Re-
gExp). By using this pattern, we can identify strings, which might be malicious for net-
work, more efficiently compared to the rules that do not use this pattern.  
In this current study, Regular Expressions will be the key part of our methodology, 
since we are aiming in proving that this technique is much more productive and effec-
tive than the traditional exact match pattern used up until now, especially when it is 
combined with other technologies such as Deep Packet Inspection. 
An extended explanation of the tools and the techniques used in order to write this dis-
sertation, both on theoretical and practical level, will be provided on Chapter 6.  
At this point, I would like to thank my supervisor professor Mr. Dimitrios Baltatzis for 
his help, the knowledge that he provided it to me and for aspiring me on working on this 
certain topic for my dissertation. Also, I would like to thank my family and friends for 
being supportive and believing on me and my skills. 
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1 Introduction[1],[2] 
Nowadays, human activities are more that ever dependant on Internet and Network Sys-
tems. Especially, for economical and commercial activities, a new perspective was giv-
en to them after taking advantage of the World Wide Web making them simpler and 
faster in comparison with the traditional ways of doing things.  
However, with the rapid increase in use of the Information  Systems, it was inevitable 
the increment of the threats and criminals that are targeting to unprotected or poorly se-
cured systems and networks in order to take advantage of their victims in various ways. 
Attackers will, commonly, make use of various attacks and techniques that are aiming 
in disrupting the availability, confidentiality and integrity of the system. 
For avoiding such incidents, more and more, individuals, enterprises or institutes, are 
choosing to deploy Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems that match their needs 
in order to protect more proactively and sufficiently their networks, since the usage of a 
simple anti-virus or firewall is not adequate enough to protect their systems. 
The need of establishing such systems is made mandatory, as well, by the fact that at-
tackers are using more advanced methods of corrupting the functions of a system, which 
are able of bypassing the firewall or the anti-virus, that are usually integral elements of 
an information system. 
No one can question the need and the protection that Intrusion Detection Systems offer 
to the modern Information Systems and Networks, but, still, they cannot be seen as a 
silver bullet against all the threats, that are getting more and more advanced. Due to lot 
of technological limitations, Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems can be vulner-
able to attacks, as well, or fail to detect some threats efficiently. For that reason, a lot of 
studies and different implementations are tested and developed in order to minimize the 
sensitive aspects of IDPS. 
According to the needs and the threats that the individual may face, there is a great list 
of options and software that can be used. Among those options, the most famous are 
Snort and Suricata, as well as Bro, NIDS and OSSEC HIDS. In the current dissertation , 
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we are using the Snort IDS, since it meets the requirements needed for our purposes 
concerning the Deep Packet Inspection element needed. 
Apart from the above, with the help of a more advanced feature of Snort in combination 
with the DPI features of Wireshark, we are going to construct, test and put into compar-
ison against the conventional methods our Regular Expression rule, designed especially 
for the purposes of this dissertation. In addition to the above, we have created a case 
study of detecting EternalBlue and DoublePulsar threats, in order to point out the prac-
tical and realistic value of our method. More details about the case study will be men-
tioned later on Chapters 4 and 5. 
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2 Related Work 
There is a great source of related work done previously, each of them, usually, having a 
different approach on how Intrusion Detection Systems, mainly Snort, can use Deep 
Packet Inspection in combination with other approaches in order to improve their effi-
ciency. 
Dr. V.M. Thakare et al.[3] are doing a survey on the existing techniques related to the 
combination of Deep Packet Inspection and the Regular Expression pattern. They start 
by pointing out the positive aspects of the Deep Packet Inspection compared to the tra-
ditional types of packet inspection that have been used over the years and how the Reg-
ular Expressions can join forces with DPI.  The first of these technologies, which they 
examine, is LaFA (Lookahead Finite Automata). According to them, LaFA has the huge 
advantage that it does not bind great amount of the system’s memory due to its proper-
ties. LaFA is a software-based Regular Expression approach.Next, they are examining a 
hardware-based solution called Ternary Content Addressable Mememory (TCAM), 
which is used widely on network devices. This type of approach is ideal for the cases, 
where it is important to have a high rate of Regular Expression Match.The third ap-
proach follows the Stride Finite Automata (StriFA). As LaFA, StriFA is, also, a soft-
ware-based answer for implementing a Deep Packet Inspection – Regular Expression 
pair. On the pros of this technique is the high speed that it can offer, as well as the low 
requirements it has in terms of memory usage. The fourth technique is the Compact De-
terministic Finite Automata (Compact DFA). The authors indicate the fact that Compact 
DFA is just an altered, compressed version of the classic Deterministic Finite Automata 
(DFA) approach. One of the most popular algorithms using this approach is Aho-
Corasick (AC algorithm), which is, also, the one used by Snort by default. Last but not 
least, authors are examining the Extended Character Set DFA technique, the purpose of 
which is the reduce of the memory needs that the original DFA has. 
C. Amuthavalli et al.[4] are taking a look into two more traditional approaches concern-
ing the solutions that can be combined with the Deep Packet Inspection. The first one is 
the Deterministic Finite Automata (DFA) and the second one the Non-Deterministic 
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Finite Automata (NFA). They do, also, make an extended description of the theory re-
lated to the Intrusion Detection Systems, their evolution throughout the years, as well 
as, their functions and the types that they are divided in. Next, they describe the differ-
ent kinds of packet inspection, focusing mainly on the Deep Packet Inspection and the 
methods that  makes use of it. On the fourth section of their paper, they comment on the 
different types of network attacks by categorizing them into two major classes, the ac-
tive and the passive attacks. Finally, they are closing their paper with the fifth section, 
which examines the theory and the features of the Regular Expression technique, the 
mathematic expressions of the DFA and NFA and how the Deep Packet Inspection and 
Regular Expressions are used alongside for detecting specific patterns, by giving a brief 
example of detecting Yahoo traffic with the help of the Application Layer Packet Clas-
sifier, Linux L7. 
G. Douglas et al.[5] are examining from their perspective the combination of Deep 
Packet Inspection and Regular Expressions. More specifically, their paper is focusing 
on the conversion of Deep Packet Inspection rule sets into a Regular Expressions-like 
meta format. For the needs of their demonstration, they developed a tool, called 
Snort2Reg Translator. With the help of this translator, they were able of converting 
Snort rules into Regular Expressions without affecting the accuracy of the analysis. Al-
though, as they state, they were other attempts of transforming rules into another type of 
expressions, none of them were focusing on the Regular Expressions pattern, which, 
according to them, is highly beneficial for Intrusion Detection Systems due to its syntax. 
For that reason, the authors were able, as well, to designate the format of the regular ex-
pressions structure by taking into account the type of the protocol that the converted 
rule was intended for. However, there are some limitations to that method since there 
might be some parts of the Snort rule content that it cannot be transformed into Regular 
Expressions efficiently. On the fifth section of the paper the authors provide us, in de-
tails, the results of transforming a couple of Snort rules into Regular Expressions. 
Yi Wang [6], on her paper, is making her research on how Regular Expression Match-
ing can be proven beneficial for Network Intrusion Detection Systems. The main target 
of the paper is the use of an Improved Grouping Algorithm (IGA) for improving Yu al-
gorithm. At the beginning of the paper, Wang is stating the basic principles of Regular 
Expressions, as well as, the mathematic expressions for the Non-Deterministic Finite 
Automata and Deterministic Finite Automata. Up next, she is explaining the idea behind 
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the Regular Expression Grouping Algorithm that will be used in order to improve the 
algorithm. For the sake of the analysis, Wang performed the testing with different pa-
rameters using three different engines: L7-Filter, Snort and Bro and comments on the 
results.  
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3 Related Theory 
In this chapter, we are going to have a look at the related theory that it is associated with 
this dissertation. 
First of all we are going to examine some concepts linked with the basic theory of Intru-
sion Detection and Prevention Systems, such as their definition, the problems that are in 
charge of taking care of, the different aspects and types of them, as well as the chal-
lenges that we have to face. 
The second part of this chapter will be dedicated to the Levels of the Packet Inspection 
and the three categories that they fall into. 
 
3.1  Basic Theory on Intrusion Detection and Pre-
vention Systems (IDPS).
[7]
 
 
Undoubtedly, Internet is a very powerful tool that has given new dynamics to business 
and organizations world widely.  The advantages that Internet has offered have a bene-
ficial impact to the implemented strategies and the continuous growth related to the In-
formation Systems, however we cannot overlook the disadvantages, that can be tre-
mendous and harmful if ignored. 
Attackers, nowadays, have developed techniques and tools that are more powerful, 
stealthy and persistent, which can help them make their way within their desired Infor-
mation System more easily, aiming at stealing valuable information and intelligence re-
lated to the victim or control them remotely causing disruption and distraction of the 
system that is under attack. 
In order to detect and treat efficiently and proactively these kind of malicious behavior, 
it is essential the correct implementation of an Intrusion Detection System, that can be 
either a software or hardware.  According to the SANS Institute, an Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS) is a system dedicated to the employment of security of the rest of the sys-
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tems, within a particular network.  An IDS is in charge of monitoring the systems and 
the network traffic among them in order to analyze and detect abnormal or hostile traf-
fic that is generated either outside or within the network by misusing it or trying to at-
tack it. At this point, we have to mention the fact that an IDS defers in many ways from 
the firewalls. The most basic and fundamental difference is the fact that a firewall can 
only block external malicious activities and it is unable to do anything once the attacker 
has reached the internals of the network. In other words, firewalls can provide only pe-
rimeter protection of a network. So, it is essential to point out that a firewall can be used 
in combination with IDS since it cannot perform any actions for internal malicious be-
haviors.  
From the definition mentioned above, we can understand that the main goal of Intrusion 
Detection System is to recognize potential incidents.  When such an incident is identi-
fied, the IDS, usually, performs a series of functions such as: 
 Making local records regarding the detected incident. 
 Generating notifications for the security administrators about uncommon, ob-
served incidents. These notifications are, also, known as alerts. 
 Providing details and comprehensive reports related to the incidents that caught 
the attention of the IDS. 
Once more, we have to make an important differentiation.  IDS must not be confused 
with a different type of technology called Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS). In con-
trast with an IDS, an IPS aims in responding to a observed thread by taking a series of 
actions. An IPS, commonly, will perform the following actions: 
 Terminates the attack (e.g. by preventing the attacker to access the target(s)). 
 Make adjustments to the current security environment (e.g. Implement reconfi-
gurations at network devices such as firewalls, routers, switches etc). 
 Perform removal or replacement of malicious components (e.g. remove a suspi-
cious attached file from an e-mail). 
Although, Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems are a valuable asset for protect-
ing one’s network, these systems should not be thought to be a silver bullet, as they 
cannot provide absolute and accurate protection against threats. In order to make this 
fact more clear, we have to take a look at the types of the alerts that an IDPS can pro-
duce: 
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 True Positive: It is the state where a potential threat or attack really occurs and 
the IDS triggers an alert. 
 True Negative: The state in which no threat occurs and therefore no alert is trig-
gered as well. 
 False Negative: The state under which a threat occurs for real and the IDS is not 
successful in detecting it. This type of alert is thought to be very dangerous for a 
network, since part or the entire network might be compromised without the 
administrators being notified in order to take care of the issue. 
 False Positive: The state under which no attack or threat occurs against the net-
work, however the IDS falsely generates an alert. 
No matter how well established an IDS is, there is no way of eliminating completely 
false positive and false negative alerts and hence, the accuracy of the IDS depends upon 
the total rate of falsely and correctly generated alerts. Many administrators are configur-
ing their IDSs in a way of minimizing false negative alerts, by increasing the rate of 
false positive alerts. In this way, they can make sure that they will not miss any threat or 
attack against their network; however the incensement of false positives has as a result 
the waste of analysis resources for discerning true positives from false positives. More 
specifically, the precision of an IDS can described with the formula: 
 
where TP represents the sum of the True Positives and FP the sum of the False Posi-
tives. 
 
3.1.1 Types of IDPSs 
 
As, already, mentioned there are various technologies and types of IDPSs, depending on 
the needs that each user/network wants to cover.  
Before moving on taking a look at each of these technologies more precisely, it will be 
very helpful to mention some general information that apply for the majority of the 
IDPS technologies. 
The components and the architecture used for designing the IDPS are of high impor-
tance and may vary for each type. However, implying them in an appropriate way guar-
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antees that our IDPS will work at the highest of its potentials and that it will not be ex-
posed or pose a threat for the network. Typically, an IDPS consists of the following 
components: 
 Sensors and Agents: This kind of components is in charge of monitoring and 
analyzing the traffic. Although, both sensors and agents are serving the same 
needs (monitoring and analyzing), they are used in different kinds of IDPS. Sen-
sors can be found in network-based, wireless or network behavior analysis 
(NBA) systems, whereas agents are used on host-based systems, where they are 
used for identifying suspicious traffic, only, for that specific host, for which are 
installed. 
 Management Server: A centralized device that accepts as input information ga-
thered by the sensors and the agents. The main duty of this component is to 
manage this information, however it is not a mandatory element of an IDPS, 
since the information can be monitored and managed by the administrator 
straight from the sensors or the agents. Some of the management servers can al-
so analyze the information gathered. Management servers can be either hard-
ware or software and depending on the IDPS’s deployment size, the number of 
this device can vary. 
 Database Server: A server used for storing information produced by sensors, 
agents or management servers. 
 Console: Software used by administrators to control the IDPS. Some of the con-
soles are responsible of helping the administrators in configuring sensors and 
agent, applying updates, whereas there are consoles strictly dedicated to moni-
toring and analyzing. Of course, there are consoles that can combine all of these 
characteristics and provide to the user a mixture of all the functions described 
above. 
 
Network-based IDPS 
 
This type of IDPS is responsible of monitoring the traffic and the devices of a particular 
network. It is, also, in charge of analyzing the network (e.g. IPv6, ICMP, IGMP), trans-
port (e.g. TCP, UDP) and application (e.g. DNS, HTTP, SMTP) layer in order recog-
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nize any malicious behavior within the network. Analysis can be performed at the 
hardware layer, as well, however this capability is limited. 
When it comes to the components used for designing a network-based IDPS, there are 
multiple sensors and consoles, one or more management servers and, if necessary, one 
or more database servers. In the case of the network-based IDPS, the sensors used fall 
into two categories: 
 Appliance-Based Sensors: This kind of sensors consists of specific hardware and 
sensor software. Commonly, the hardware is specialized for sensor use, as well 
as the Network Interface Cards (NICs) and their drivers. By using this kind of 
sensors, we can achieve more efficient capture of packets and at the same time 
improve the quality of analysis. The firmware used, also, has a fundamental role 
in achieving all these optimizations for improving the performance of the IDPS. 
 Software-Only Sensors: Sensors in the form of software without the need of ap-
pliance. The only condition that has to be fulfilled is that the host, on which this 
software will be installed, has to meet some minimum specifications. The sensor 
may come in the form of an Operating System or might be installed on an al-
ready employed Operating System. 
Other than the components of the IDPS, administrators would, also, have to choose 
where the sensors should be placed within the network. On the network-based IDPS 
there are two modes that and administrator can materialize: 
Inline mode: In the inline mode, the sensor is placed in a way that the network traffic, 
that has to be examined, passes through it before entering the internal network. Since, 
this is a description that reminds a lot the function of a firewall, in many cases, there is a 
good idea of employing firewall/IDPS hybrid devices, combining the benefits of two 
devices in one. However, firewall and IDPS can be two different entities, each of which 
is responsible for each own security part. The main reason of using this mode is to let 
the IDPS block network traffic when an attack or abnormal activity occurs. Inline mode 
sensors should be placed close to network security devices, such as firewalls, between 
external and internal networks, as well as, between different internal networks that must 
be separated. When the sensor used is not the hybrid type mentioned above, it can be 
used in order to secure and monitor more than one parts of the network and, at the same 
time, reduce the traffic that has to be analyzed. At this architecture, sensors can be used 
as well in order to balance the load between security devices. 
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Passive mode: A passive mode sensor does not observe the actual network traffic, as the 
traffic does not pass through it. This kind of sensor mode examines copies of the net-
work traffic and it is used between parts of the same network, when there is a need of 
securing their separation. There are many methods of applying this architecture, some 
of which are the followings:  
 Spanning Port: The passive mode sensor can take advantage of the switches’ 
spanning port. The spanning port allows to the sensor, connected to it, to moni-
tor incoming and outcoming network traffic. The advantages of this method are 
the fact that it can be implemented with relatively easiness and limited cost, 
however it can raise problems when the configuration is not done properly. In 
this case, the sensor will not be able to see all the traffic passing through the 
switch. Another important drawback of this method, is the fact that when the 
traffic load is heavy, the spanning port might be disable or unable to give a full 
picture of the traffic to the sensor. Last, but not least, many switches can provide 
only one spanning port and therefore, this method is not suitable for networks 
that are in need of multiple IDPS sensors or other security devices. 
 Network tap: Another method that can be materialized in order to achieve this 
architecture is network tap. Network tap is the procedure of placing the sensor at 
the physical layer by connecting it directly with the cable, for example. In this 
way, the sensor can get a duplicate of the traffic that passes through the cable. 
However, this approach involves a lot of problems and network downtime, at 
both stages of the implementation and production. Another issue regarding this 
method is that the implementation is not provided by default. It is an add-on op-
tion and therefore can be more costly. 
 IDS Load Balancer: The last solution that we are going to mention here is the 
IDS Load Balancer. The aim of this device is to sum up the network traffic and 
drive it to the monitoring systems. An IDS Load Balancer receives the copies ei-
ther from some spanning ports or network tap and adds the copies all together. 
After it is done collecting and processing these copies, it sends them to devices, 
such as IDPS sensors, depending on the configuration that the administrator has 
realized. There is a majority of configurations among which an administrator 
can choose from, some of which are the followings: 
 Divide traffic among different IDPS sensors. 
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 Divide the traffic dynamically to multiple IDPS sensors according to the 
volume, so that none of the sensors will be devastated and crashed down by the 
high traffic. 
 Divide the traffic to IDPS sensors based upon specific characteristics such as 
IP addresses or protocols used. 
The major disadvantage of this method is the fact that the traffic has to be separated into 
different sensors. This can reduce the detection accuracy of the system, because each 
sensor will see different stages of a malicious activity, that may occur, and not the 
whole picture in order to recognize this act as abnormal and fire a notification. 
All in all the best way of implementing a Network-Based IDPS and recommended by 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), is the usage of the inline-
mode sensors, instead of the passive ones. As, already, mentioned both of these ap-
proaches can be effective when it comes to detection (although in the passive mode, 
there is reduced accuracy detection and no real-time analysis of the traffic), however, 
only in the inline-mode, we can build a system that can provide us prevention options, 
as well. 
 This type of IDPS can detect and notify us for many different types of suspicious 
activity. A great part of them are, usually, reconnaissance attempts and attacks that are 
related to the application, transport and network layers. Some examples of such attacks 
are the followings: 
 Banner grabbing: The procedure of gathering information about a remote PC 
and the services that it is running by taking advantage of its open ports. 
 Buffer Overflow: It is an attempt of sending more data than a buffer can hold in 
its memory in order to overflow. It targets at disrupting a program, causing the 
corruption of data or execution of malicious code. 
 Port Scanning: It is a technique for examining a host or a server for open ports. 
Port Scanning can be used by both administrators and attackers. The first one is 
using this method in order to check if the security policies are established as 
they should. On the other hand, an attacker can take advantage of this method in 
order to gather information about the open ports of the victim, as well as the ser-
vices that are running on the host. 
 SYN flood: For this type of attack, the attacker sends SYN messages to the tar-
get, in order to exhaust the victim’s resources and cause a Denial of Service. 
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 IP Spoofing: IP Spoofing is a method dedicated to hiding the real identity of the 
attacker, by using a false source address for the IP packets that the attacker sends 
to the victim. 
The above attacks are only indicatives of a great list that the Network-based IDPS can 
detect. Some of them, not only are able to trigger an alert when a suspicious behavior is 
observed, but, also, knowing the vulnerabilities of the network that are protecting, they 
can provide us the likelihood of an attack being successful. Usually, an IDPS is priori-
tizing the events detecting according to their severity. This utility can be proven of great 
help to the administrator, especially when there are a lot of events generated at the same 
time since they can determine which of them are urgent and have to be faced imme-
diately. Concerning the accuracy of those systems, we have to point out that they can 
highly generate false positives and false negatives. More specifically, false negatives 
can be a product of the fact that these kinds of systems, usually, are signature-based. In 
other words, these IDPSs cannot detect a threat that is not within their database. This 
has as a result that new threats will not be detected by the IDPS and therefore we will 
have lots of false negatives. On the other hand, such systems, also, need a lot of tuning 
and customization depending on the characteristics and needs of each network, other-
wise the system might mistake some common behavior as a suspicious one and conse-
quently, it will generate many false positive alerts. 
Expect from the accuracy rate, Network-based IDPSs have another significant draw-
back.  If an attack or event is linked with any type of encryption (e.g. VPNs, HTTPS, 
SSH sessions etc), the IDPS will not be able to detect and generate an alert to the ad-
ministrators. For facing this problem, the IDPSs could perform analysis on the packets 
before there are encrypted or after they are decrypted, however, this method causes a 
significant amount of traffic to be delayed. The creation of a great amount of traffic can 
be proven disastrous depending on the architecture that we have implemented, causing 
the disruption of our system or losing parts of the packets that have to be analyzed for 
malicious components. IDPSs are, also, vulnerable to Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) and blinding attacks. These kinds of attacks are not intending to harm the sys-
tem directly, but to wreak havoc and draw attention from the main attack. 
An indicative architecture of this deployment can be seen on the picture below. 
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Picture 1: Inline Network-Based IDPS Architecture. 
 
Wireless IDPS 
 
A wireless network is a network that gives to the devices, within the network range, the 
capability of connecting to it without having to use any physical connection. Such net-
works are characterized by a limited range level and are usually found within offices or 
campuses. Wireless networks can be described as an expansion of the already wired 
network that aims in satisfying the mobility needs of the users within it. 
The most common standards used on the wireless networks are the followings: 
 802.11: It is the first wireless standard of the 802.11 family, introduced in 1997. 
It can provide a transmission rate of either 1 or 2 Mbps at the frequency of 2.4 
-16- 
GHz. The type of the modulation that it uses can be either DSSS or FHSS and its 
range can be 20 meters indoors and 100 meters outdoors. 
 802.11a: It was introduced in 1999 and it can support up to 54-Mbps at the 
5GHz using the OFDM modulation. It can provide us with a range of approx-
imately 35 meters indoors and 120 meters outdoors. 
 802.11b: It was introduced together with the 802.11a protocol. As well as 
802.11a, 802.11b can provide us a variety of transmission rates up to 11-Mbps at 
the frequency band of 2.4GHz. The modulation that it uses is the DSSS and it 
can reach up to 35 meters indoors and 140 meters outdoors. 
 802.11g: This protocol was added to the 802.11 family in 2003. It also uses a 
frequency of 2.4GHz supporting up to 54-Mbps. It works with the OFDM mod-
ulation and its approximate range can go up to 38 meters indoors and 140 meters 
outdoors. 
 802.11n: It was available in late 2009 and it introduced a new kind of modula-
tion called MIMO-OFDM. With this kind of modulation, we could increase the 
data throughput by using additional antennas for transmitting and receiving. De-
pending on the frequency that uses (either 2.4GHz or 5GHz), it could provide us 
a transmission rate up to 150-Mbps and it could support a range up to 70 meters 
indoors and 250 meters outdoors. 
The IEEE 802.11 family consists of more protocols; however we are not going to men-
tion them all since there are not that much popular.  
For covering a bunch of security concerns, these protocols are combined with three dif-
ferent types of security features. The first one is known as Wired Equivalent Privacy 
(WEP). However, due to the low levels of security that WEP offered to the network, 
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) and Wi-Fi Protected Access II (WPA2) were introduced 
to cover the vulnerabilities of the WEP security protocol. Nowadays, all of the three are 
available for use, with WPA2 being the strongest among the three security protocols. 
Regarding the threats that a wireless network has to face, there is no great difference 
from the wired ones, however the conditions are different. A good example of explain-
ing this, is the fact that an attack can be performed remotely on a wired network, whe-
reas for attacking a wireless one we have to be within its range. Still, what makes a 
wireless network vulnerable to threats is the fact that the security measures, usually, are 
poor. Most of them have no or weak authentication mechanisms making them the per-
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fect candidates for various types of attacks such as the most famous, when it comes to 
the wireless networks, man-in-the-middle attacks (MITM). 
When it comes to the components of the Wireless IDPS, we can say that, except from 
the sensors, they are identical to the ones used on the Network-based IDPS and with the 
same functions. The sensors used in this type of IDPS are different, due to the com-
plexity that the wireless element introduces to the network. In contrast, with the Net-
work-based IDPS sensors, the Wireless ones cannot monitor all the traffic at the same 
time and therefore they have to monitor each time one channel. When a sensor is done 
monitoring a channel, it has to switch off, change into the new channel and then turns 
on for monitoring it. At periods when the monitoring of a single channel lasts way too 
long, there is the danger of missing malicious behavior on other channels and as a result 
the existence of many false negatives. For eliminating the existence of this type of 
alerts, many sensors are making use of a method known as channel scanning. This me-
thod is responsible for changing the channel that a sensor is monitoring every few 
seconds for reducing the probability of an undetected malicious activity. The sensors 
used in a Wireless IDPS can belong to one of the following categories: 
 Dedicated Sensors: They are devices that are used for wireless IDPS purposes. 
Their characteristic is the fact that this kind of sensors does not transfer the traf-
fic from the source to the destination, since they are, commonly, passive. They 
can, also, perform directly a traffic analysis of the network monitored, however, 
there are other types of dedicated sensors that collect the traffic and assign the 
task of the analysis to a management server. The connection of them is usually 
wired and is done via Ethernet cable. Dedicated sensors are divided into two dif-
ferent types, the fixed and the mobile, each of them, useful for different kinds of 
implementations. 
 Bundled with an AP: There are many vendors, nowadays, that enhance the APs 
by adding to them IDPS abilities. However, this kind of detection is less precise 
and accurate if compared with the deployment of a dedicated sensor. The re-
stricted capabilities of the sensors bundled with an AP originate from the fact 
that they have to behave both as Access Points and sensors monitoring the traf-
fic. For this reason, this type of sensors is an adequate solution if we have to 
monitor only a single channel or band, otherwise there will be performance 
problems and disruption within the network. 
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 Bundled with a Wireless Switch: Last but not least, there are sensors bundled 
with a Wireless Switch, which perform some limited wireless IDPS capabilities. 
Compared to the previous types of sensors, this one is the less capable of per-
forming a decent detection and therefore dedicated sensors are selected more 
frequently for having stronger detection abilities. 
The architecture of an indicative Wireless IDPS is shown on the following picture. 
 
Picture 2: Wireless IDPS architecture. 
 
Finally, we are going to mention some of the types of suspicious behavior that can be 
detected by a wireless IDPS.  
 Unauthorized devices: One of the most common suspicious behaviors that can 
be detected within a wireless network is when an unauthorized device is trying 
to access the network. Sensors can identify the unauthorized devices thanks to 
information and tuning that has be done to the IDPS by the administrators. 
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 Inadequately secured devices:  Wireless IDPS sensors can determine whether a 
device fulfills the security requirements set by the administrators. Within the 
checks, performed by the sensors in order to identify the security status of the 
device, are the detection of misconfigurations or the use of a weak, outdated pro-
tocol. According to NIST, the majority of the alerts generated belong to this cat-
egory. 
 Use of uncommon patterns:  Some types of sensors are able of detecting anoma-
lies within a wireless network. At this kind of violation fall abnormal behaviors 
that are strange to network, for example when the amount of a network’s traffic 
is much higher than the one used or if a known device within the network is be-
having quite strange. All these can be indicators of the network being compro-
mised and therefore an alert can be triggered. 
 Network scanners: In many cases, the attackers are using tools such as network 
scanners for identifying unsecured or poorly secured networks. A sensor can ob-
serve this kind of actions and can generate an alert. However, the sensors can 
only identify scanners that are active, or in other words, scanners that create 
network traffic. 
 Denial of Service (DoS): In this category are included attacks such as flooding 
and jamming. The first one is associated with transmitting a huge amount of 
messages against the target on a high rate in order to slow it down and finally, 
make it unavailable. On the other hand, jamming is an attack that uses the emis-
sion of electromagnetic energy against a host’s frequencies and causes its system 
disruption and unavailability. For detecting this kind of attacks, the IDPSs are 
counting the number of times that a behavior like this occurs and if this number 
is above a certain threshold, an alert will be triggered. 
 Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks: This is an attack that it cannot be detected 
by each and every wireless IDPS sensor, however, there are special sensors that 
can identify abnormal behavior of the devices within the monitored network and 
generate an alert for notifying the administrators regarding the suspicious atti-
tude. 
In comparison with other types of IDPSs, the wireless ones are typically more precise. 
Their high accuracy originates from the limited number of the wireless protocols, how-
ever if the IDPS is not tuned appropriately, many false positives can be generated. 
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Wireless IDPSs are not a silver bullet as they have their own limitations. For example, if 
a network is poorly secured and the attacker is performing a passive monitoring of the 
victim’s system, the IDPS cannot detect this type of suspicious attitude. This type of 
IDPSs is weak against evasion techniques. The attacker can target one of the sensors 
used by the IDPS and compromise it or even perform two attacks at the same time. The 
one will work as a feint attack and the second one will be the main attack that will not 
be noticed by the IDPS. 
 
Host-Based IDPS 
 
 
Picture 3: Host-Based IDPS architecture. 
 
Before moving on the description of the host-based IDPS, an indicative example of its 
architecture is shown on the picture above. 
Host-based IDPS is one of the most common types of IDPSs. Its main characteristic is 
that it is monitoring exclusively a single host and it generates reports and alerts when 
abnormal behavior is detected.  They can be assigned to protect various types of agents 
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such as servers, client hosts, whether they are desktops or laptops and application ser-
vices, such as web or database server programs. In the last case, the IDPS is, also, 
known as application-based IDPS. 
This kind of IDPSs are capable of logging, detecting and preventing events that might 
occur while they monitor the traffic sent to or transmitted from the host, which they are 
appointed to protect. They are able of detected a great amount of suspicious events, by 
using code analysis in order to detect a malicious component, such as a malware and 
prevent its execution and further spread. By using code analysis, IDPS are capable of 
preventing unauthorized access, privilege escalation or code execution. As the rest of 
the IDPSs, this one can perform Network Traffic Analysis and Filtering.  
Although, the techniques that they are using, the accuracy of this type of systems is not 
ideal as are prone to false positives and false negatives alerts and therefore deploying 
such an IDPS requires a well-done tuning. Host-based IDPSs are limited by a signifi-
cant number of limitations such as causing performance issues because of the consump-
tion of host’s resources. 
3.2 Packet Inspection Levels
 [8], [9]
 
 
There are many technologies related to the packet inspection that is used in networks. 
These technologies can be divided into three categories: 
 Shallow Packet Inspection (SPI) 
 Medium Packet Inspection (MPI) 
 Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) 
In the Shallow Packet Inspection (SPI), we are examining only the headers of the pack-
et. These are located at the start of the data containing information such as the IP ad-
dresses of the sender and the receiver and are, usually, used for routing purposes. There-
fore, the parties that are involved in the communication can retain a level of anonymity, 
since we do not examine the payload of the packet and we do not have any further 
knowledge about the packet’s contents. 
This type of inspection is the simplest one among the three types mentioned and can be 
found in firewalls used by operating systems, such as Windows XP and Vista. Fire-
walls, that are using this kind of packet inspection, check the headers of the packets 
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looking for the sender’s and receiver’s IP addresses and based on a blacklist, they can 
determine either if they will block or permit the packet entering or leaving a host. No 
notification is sent to the packet’s source for letting them know that their packet was 
dropped down. 
Going back to the kind of information that SPI examines, essentially, the technology 
can extract data that it is related with the second and third layer of the OSI layer. In oth-
er words, except from the IP addresses mentioned above, SPI can also take a look at 
other aspects of the packet, as well, such as the number of packets of which a message 
is consisting of and the number of hops up until the packet reaches its final destination.  
The next level of packet inspection is the medium packet inspection (MPI). MPI, most 
frequently, is used by proxies or devices that are located between the Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) and the end users. Similarly to SPI, MPI checks the headers of the 
packet for its IP addresses. However, it is not the only data that examines in order to 
decide whether a packet will enter the network or not. MPI uses a parse-list that will 
help it approve specific packet types based upon their data format and their associated 
location on the Internet. 
MPI devices are used in cases where administrators want to prevent certain activities 
such as downloading content from specific web sites. They can, also, be used when 
there is the need of give priority to particular types of packets. This can be achieved by 
examining the application layer of the packet. 
The last of the packet inspection’s levels is DPI.  By employing this type of packet in-
spection operators and administrators are able of detecting the exact source and content 
of every packet within the network monitored. DPI is inspected every and each of the 
network layers, making it ideal for performing detailed network analysis and it can be 
implemented even by using software or hardware devices. In this dissertation, we are 
using two tools, described later on Chapter 5, that are using DPI for different purposes 
each, Wireshark and Snort. 
Although there are useful ways in which DPI can be deployed, there are a lot of con-
cerns about the privacy, the free flow of information, the network security and even 
more, since those that make use of this technique can monitor and implement various 
control actions to the traffic going through the network. A recent example had as a re-
sult many to reasons oppose against DPI is the Network Neutrality, which is on danger 
since Internet Providers, mainly in United States of America, are trying to manipulate 
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and control the traffic that their uses are requesting. For the most part, this is happening 
by violating the Network Neutrality and imposing discrimination or changes to the data 
requested by the users. 
The picture below depicts the layers that can be examined by each of the three levels of 
inspection. 
 
 
Picture 4: Levels of Packet Inspection. 
 
3.3 Regular Expression 
[10]
 
 
Regular Expressions (RegEx) is a technique used in computer science that can make use 
of a group of characters, in order to create a searching pattern. This technique can be 
combined with a series of mathematical algorithms for helping the individual to quickly 
find out the defined search pattern within a text and even replace it with another value. 
The idea for developing this concept came in the late 1950s. The father of the method is 
considered to be Stephen Cole Kleene, an American mathematician, who started to de-
velop the concept of the regular language. Regular Expressions started becoming more 
commonly used with the rise of the Unix systems and their adoption by them.  
-24- 
A Regular Expression pattern can both contain regular characters, in other words cha-
racters that are having a literal meaning, and metacharacters, which are characters that 
can have a different meaning from the one that might have traditionally. A description 
of such characters will be given later on this section, as well as, some examples in order 
to explain sufficiently how Regular Expressions work. The content of a Regular Expres-
sion pattern can vary ranging from being identical to the one of an Exact Match’s pat-
tern to more complicated expressions. Although, Regular Expressions can mimic the 
Exact Match’s pattern, this kind of use is restricted, because it cannot unveil the full po-
tentials of this technique. 
For that reason, Regular characters and metacharacters are commonly combined in a 
certain way for creating a more advance searching pattern, in contrast with the patterns 
used on the Exact Match method. 
On the table that follows below we will give a brief explanation of the basic syntax of 
the regular expressions along with some indicative examples for each case. Please note 
that wherever an example or sample match is not mentioned, it is due to the description 
being understandable without any further explanation. 
 
Characters 
 
Character Description Example – Sample Match 
\d 
Using this regular expres-
sion character will have as 
a result to display all the 
digit characters. 
If we have a file with 
names and phone numbers, 
using this character will 
give us back only the phone 
numbers without the cor-
responding names. 
\D 
This character expression 
will give us back all the 
characters that are not di-
gits. 
Continuing from our pre-
vious example, this time if 
we use this notation, we get 
the list of the names within 
the file without their phone 
numbers. 
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\w 
Using this expression will 
have as a result to get back 
all the word characters, 
which include ASCII cha-
racters, digits and unders-
cores. This pattern is not 
convenient if we need to 
search for non ASCII cha-
racters, such as ë or ñ. 
If we use the \w pattern to 
the phrase: “Good mornig, 
Amélie“we will get back 
every single character ex-
cept from the comma 
(which is not a word cha-
racter) and the é (which is 
not an ASCII character). 
Also, the spaces between 
the words will be consi-
dered a mismatch for this 
expression. 
\W 
This expression will dis-
play for us all the charac-
ters that do not belong to 
the category of word cha-
racters. 
Continuing from the pre-
vious example, this time, 
using the \W expression, 
we will have a match with 
comma, é and the spaces 
within the phrase. 
\s 
Using this expression will 
have as a result to get back 
all the whitespace charac-
ters, in other words, the 
spaces, tabs or line breaks. 
 
 
 
\S 
 
 
This notation will match 
every single character that 
is not a whitespace charac-
ter. 
 
[^] 
The square brackets that 
contain this specific symbol 
at the beginning indicate 
that will match any pattern 
For example, if we are us-
ing the Regular Expression 
“[^abct]”, will have as a 
result to match words such 
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that is not included within 
them. As a whole these 
specific symbols are called 
negated set. 
as “hello” that do not con-
tain the letters within the 
square brackets and after 
the caret symbol. A mis-
match for this Regular Ex-
pression will be a word 
such as “bat” that contains 
all the letters that are within 
the negated set. 
. 
The full stop symbol will 
match each and every cha-
racter. 
For example if we have the 
Regular Expression “.a”, it 
will match each and every 
pattern that contains an “a” 
letter. 
 
Anchors 
 
In the Regular Expression syntax, anchors are special characters that help us indicate 
the position within a string. In other words, when they are used they define the position 
of the matching. 
Character Description Example – Sample Match 
^ 
When used it will match 
the beginning of a string or 
a line. We have to point out 
that ^ and [^] is not the 
same expression, since 
when it is met within 
brackets is equal to a “not” 
expression. 
We are using the sample 
match ^a, which searches 
for strings that begin with 
the “a” letter. The string 
that contains the phrase 
“apples are red” is a perfect 
match for this sample 
match, but not the string 
that contains the phrase: 
“bananas are yellow”. 
$ The dollar symbol, in con- This time, we will use the 
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trast with the previous one, 
will match the end of a 
string or a line. 
match sample ow$ that will 
match every string or line 
that ends in “ow”. Taking 
the strings used in the pre-
vious example, “bananas 
are yellow” will be a match 
this time for the pattern we 
used. 
\b 
This expression is known 
as word boundary. It is 
used for matching word 
that have a boundary posi-
tion. 
Let’s suppose that we want 
to search in a list of words 
for the lines that contain 
words that end in “ow”.  
We will use the match 
sample ow\b. After the 
search finishes, we will 
have as an output words 
like “yellow”, “low” or 
“shadow” and work as 
boundaries between other 
words. 
\B 
This expression will match 
all the characters except 
from the ones that work us 
boundaries. 
We are using the h\B match 
sample this time. If we ap-
ply this search pattern on 
the phrase “He tries to 
match his hat with the 
watch” the words that are a 
match are “his”, “hat” and 
“the”. “watch” is not a 
match since it is a boundary 
word and “He”, as well, 
because it starts with a cap-
ital letter 
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Quantifiers 
 
Quantifiers are expressions that help us to search for a pattern that appears a specific 
number of times. 
Character Description Example – Sample Match 
* 
This symbol must not be 
mistaken as a wildcard. In 
the Regular Expressions 
Syntax “*” matches zero 
one or more times the pat-
tern that exists before it. 
 
+ 
Matches one or more times 
the character that it us after 
it. It has to be pointed out 
that there is a small differ-
ence between “+” and “*”, 
since the first matches the 
pattern that is located be-
fore it one or more times, 
whereas the second one 
matches it if appears zero 
or more times. 
 
? 
It will match the exactly 
one character that is located 
before it. This character is 
optional and there is no 
need for a match. 
For instance, if we have the 
sample match “travel?ling”, 
it will have as a result to 
match both the words 
“traveling” and “travel-
ling”. 
? 
With a different use this 
symbol has another out-
come. Usually, the symbols 
belonging on the quantifi-
For example, if we have the 
Regular Expression 
“a\w+?” will match any 
word that contains the “a” 
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ers will try to match a pat-
tern as many times as poss-
ible. In this case, this sym-
bol, known as lazy quan-
tifier, will match a pattern 
as few times as possible. 
letter and afterward follows 
one more ASCII character. 
The outcome of the above 
will match words such as 
“alter”, “calculus” etc, but 
it will ignore words such as 
“a” because it is a sole let-
ter and nothing follows, or 
the word “America”, since 
the Regular Expression is 
case sensitive and the 
second “a” in the word is 
the last letter followed by 
nothing. 
| 
This symbol is called alte-
ration, meaning that it can 
be used within a group for 
matching various cases. 
For example, we have the 
Regular Expression  
“c(a|u)t”. This will match 
both the words “cat” and 
“cut”, because, essentially 
we are telling the Regular 
Expression that we like to 
match the above combina-
tion, either if it contains the 
letter “a” or “u”. 
{} 
The curly brackets contain 
the times that the previous 
indicator is needed to be 
matched. 
For example, we have the 
Regular Expression 
“a\w{1,3}” that will much 
any word that contains the 
letter “a” and after there are 
1 to 3 ASCII characters. In 
other words, it will match 
words such as “alter”, “ca-
mel” but will not match the 
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articles “a” and “an”. 
 
We are not going to get any further as all in all these are the basic symbols and their 
usage in Regular Expressions. Other than that, there are many more that are used much 
more rarely or others that are valid for specific programming languages.  
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4 Scope of the dissertation 
and Methodology 
Nowadays, more than ever, protecting networks from the continuously increasing 
threats is of great importance, and, in many cases, where the CIA triad (Confidentiality 
– Integrity – Availability) is out of question, maybe vital.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to propose an indicative solution for facing the prob-
lem described above. This solution combines the technologies of Deep Packet Inspec-
tion (DPI) and Regular Expressions (RegEx) matching patterns. 
The methodology that we are going to describe, aims in examining the packets captured 
from the network traffic using the tools that we are going to list later on Chapter 6. At 
the end of this methodology, we will be able to produce rules that will be using the Re-
gEx matching pattern, instead of the exact match pattern  in order to improve the effi-
ciency of our Intrusion Detection System combined with the Deep Packet Inspection 
capabilities that Snort can provide us. 
Our methodology is following a real case scenario that we have designed. We assume 
that we are having a network that consists of three types of machines, each of which 
with a different role. The first one is the Victim’s machine, a Windows 7 Operating Sys-
tem. This machine is deliberately vulnerable to the pair of threats, EternalBlue and 
DoublePulsar. More specifically, EternalBlue is an exploit related to the SMB protocol 
vulnerability that can be used as a backdoor for outdated Windows machines. Double-
Pulsar, from the other side, is a Trojan horse that can be used on Windows Operating 
Systems for opening backdoors and performing a variety of unauthorized actions such 
as injecting DLL files or executing shellcodes that can be proven malicious for the tar-
geting computer. The threat is able of deleting itself, after the attacker has reached his 
goals. For exploiting the SMB vulnerability and performing a DoublePulsar attack, we 
are going to use a second machine in the role of the attacker, running a Kali Linux Op-
erating System. A third machine, acting as a sniffing machine, in our case a Security 
Onion Operating System, will be monitoring the network traffic, recording with the help 
of Wireshark all the steps and actions performed by the Kali Linux machine for gaining 
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access to the Windows machine. At the same time, Security Onion will be running 
Sguil, which will help us have a better understanding of the situation by generating a 
couple of outcomes concerning the existing Snort rules, that will be generated due to the 
Windows machine being under attack. We are going to evaluate the rules related to the 
SMB vulnerability and with the use of the PCAP file, recorded by the Wireshark during 
the attack. We will write a Snort rule capable of helping the Intrusion Detection System 
to perform better match by using a RegExp matching pattern as part of the rule. After 
that, we are going to set this rule under test by replaying the PCAP file for checking the 
reaction of the Sguil, with the use of the new rule. Finally, we will come up with the 
results and our thoughts regarding the outcomes of that method. 
Unfortunately, for making use of such a method, there are a lot of setup and configura-
tion that has to be done for the network to run correctly before putting it into use. The 
user should, also, have a good knowledge and understanding of the Cyber Exploitation 
Life Cycle in order to be able to perform the attack described and, also, recognize its 
“footprint” within the Wireshark record. The good knowledge of a variety of tools, 
which will be described in details on Chapter 6, is, also, need. 
However, no matter the cons of the method that is going to be followed, we are going to 
prove that the use of the RegEx matching pattern, used in  writing the new Snort rule, 
will improve the performance of the our Intrusion Detection System, if used properly. 
 
 
 
 
 
  -33- 
5 Initialization 
5.1 Theoretical Implementation  
 
On this chapter, we are going to examine in detail the tools that we are going to use in 
order to fulfill the goals of our methodology described on the previous chapter. Also on 
this chapter we are going to have a brief look on the hardware used with this disserta-
tion. 
5.1.1 Tools 
 
As we, already, described on Chapter 5, our network consists of three types of virtual 
machines: the attacker (Kali Linux), the victim (Windows 7) and the traffic sniffer (Se-
curity Onion) machine. 
For having a better understanding of some of the tools used in relation to the Security 
Onion, it is beneficial to examine, in brief, its basic architecture and, afterwards, we can 
move on each tool independently. 
 
Security Onion [11] 
 
Security Onion is an Ubuntu-based distribution, used for purposes related to intrusion 
detection, network security and monitoring. For this reason, this operating system 
comes with pre-installed suites and tools that are valuable for detecting and protecting 
the network from abnormal and suspicious behaviors. 
The architecture of the operating system is described on the data flow diagram below on 
picture 5. 
Starting from the top of the diagram, we can understand that Security Onion can operate 
with two types of interfaces’ mode, the sniffing and the management one. The main dif-
ference between these modes is the fact that the sniffing one is used for monitoring the 
-34- 
network traffic and has no IP address. On the other hand, the management interface-
mode is the one that has access to the Internet by either gaining a dynamic IP via a 
DHCP or a static IP. In many cases, it is preferable the assignment of a static IP over a 
dynamic. Security Onion can have more than one sniffing interfaces depending on the 
number of the Network Interface Controllers (NICs) that are configured accordingly. 
 
Picture 5: Security Onion Architecture. 
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Security Onion is equipped with various useful tools, that we are going to use as well 
and a brief introduction of them is going to be available right up next. 
 
Sguil [12],[13] 
 
Sguil is an Open Source Software dedicated for monitoring the network. Sguil can work 
alongside with Snort in order to generate an analysis of the alerts triggered if a suspi-
cious behavior exists. The base of the Sguil software is written in TCL/TK program-
ming language. 
As many software of this type, Sguil, as well, consists of some very basic elements. 
These elements are the followings. 
The first of the components is the Server. Sguil needs a server in order to keep a collec-
tion of the sensors’ and clients’ connections. This type of information is essential, since 
it helps the server to connect to the second important part of the Sguil’s architecture, the 
Database. 
The Database and the Sguil are, usually, located on the same system, however this is not 
mandatory. Except from the data collected by the sensors or linked to the clients, data-
base maintains data related to the alerts that may be generated. 
Next, Sguil makes use of Sensors. The sensors are a core element of Sguil’s composi-
tion as they are responsible of monitoring the network’s traffic and collecting data. All  
sensors should implement full packet capture, while, at the same time Snort operates in 
alert mode. 
Last but not least, are the clients, which are the interfaces needed by the security analyst 
in order to have access to the Sguil server. 
Having the above in our minds, we can presume that Sguil has to co-operate with some 
other types of software in order to operate successfully. For example, we had mentioned 
previously that Sguil is in need of a database. The tool that is responsible of playing the 
role of the database is MySQL. Snort and Barnyard are the essence of the Sguil as they 
are responsible of the scan detection, the alerts and the decoding of them. SANCP is 
responsible of recording the TCP/IP sessions and Tcpflow performs the extraction of 
the ASCII dump of the TCP session that we want to analyze. After all, we can under-
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stand that Sguil’s architecture is a complicated one and it is the combination of various 
well-known programs that work in sync with each other. 
Currently, Sguil is on version 0.7.0 and some changes apply in comparison with its pre-
vious version 0.6.1. 
 
Snort [14] 
 
In our first case, we will use Security Onion, an Ubuntu-based distribution Operating 
System, which has pre-installed two of the most well-known open source NIDPSs, 
Snort and Suricata. Although, the way of using both NIDPSs is similar, we are going to 
use Snort, as mentioned previously, since it is the most used. 
Snort was created by Martin Roesch, as well as Chris Green and Brian Caswell that 
have contributed to the software with their work and support. According to the official 
Snort documentation, it can be configured in order to perform three of the modes below: 
 Sniffer mode: When used in the sniffer mode, all that Snort does is to, merely, 
read the packets coming and leaving the network. It, also, displays the IP and the 
headers of the packets by printing them on our console. In other words, in this 
case Snort is used as a mere network traffic sniffer. We can write the following 
command on our terminal for enabling the sniffer mode on the interface that we 
want: “snort –v –i <interface>”. There are two variations of this command. The 
first one is the command “snort –vd –i <interface>” that provide us a more de-
scriptive view of the packets, as it prints out not only the headers, but, also, the 
packet data. The second variation is the command “snort –vde –i <interface>” 
that on the top of the other outputs that we already mentioned, it let us know the 
data link layer headers of the packets. The last command can be, also, seen and 
as  “snort –d –v –e –i <interface>” 
 Packet Logger Mode: This mode saves the packets into logs. For setting Snort 
into this mode, all we need is to specify the directory in which Snort will save 
the log. An indicative of this mode is the following command “snort -vd -i  <in-
terface> ./<directory>”. With this command we are telling Snort to provide us a 
detailed view of the packets from the specified interface and save the recording 
on the specified directory. When specifying the directory in which we want the 
logs to be saved we have to be very careful to provide it correctly, otherwise 
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Snort will be terminated after providing an error message. Snort can , also, save 
the record in binary mode, if we need a more compact view of the packets saved, 
by using the command “./snort –I <interface> ./<log> -b”. We can use this mode 
as well for reading the logs that we saved by adding the option –r to the com-
mand. 
 Network Intrusion Detection System Mode: Finally, Snort can be used for Intru-
sion Detection purposes. This is the mode in which Snort will be used on this 
dissertation.  
Concerning its Intrusion Detection mode, Snort offers us the very useful capability of 
writing our very own rules. Snort rules are expressions written in a specific syntax on 
single or multiple lines. A Snort rule is divided into two different parts. The first one is 
the rule header that contains the action to be performed, the protocol that the rule is re-
lated with, the source and destination IP addresses and port. At this section, the rule, 
also, contains the “direction” of the action (e.g. from an external network to our own or 
vice versa). The rest of the components within a Snort rule, are part of the second part 
of the rule named rule option. In this section, we can find more particular information 
related with the packet that will trigger the action specified on the rule header section. 
An indicative Snort rule can be seen on the picture below. 
 
 
Picture 5: Snort Rule Structure. 
 
Snort can perform a variety of actions; however, the most common used is the alert ac-
tion. This action suggests that when a packet with the rest of the characteristics within 
the rule is found, Snort should raise an alert for notifying about this packet. This action 
-38- 
is, commonly, related with finding malicious or abnormal activities within the network 
monitored. Other actions that can be found on a Snort rules can be the followings: 
 Log: This action suggests that Snort should record the packet that will trigger it. 
 Pass: The packet associated with the rule that contains a pass action will be ig-
nored by Snort. 
 Drop:  The rule that contains the drop action will block and record the specific 
packet. 
 Reject: This action will have as a result to block the packet and, depending on 
the type of the rule’s protocol, it will perform further, corresponding actions. 
 Sdrop: This action is used when we want to block the specified packet, but we 
do not wish to log it. 
After the action component comes the protocol part. For the time being, Snort can iden-
tify suspicious actions related with the TCP, UDP, ICMP and IP protocols, although 
there are plans of adding even more in the future. The Direction Operator is a very im-
portant component of the rule since it signifies the direction from which the traffic starts 
and where it ends up. There are two types of operators that can be used. The first and 
most usual one is the -> symbol. The IP address and the port found on the left of the op-
erator are the source IP address and port. Correspondingly, the port and address found 
on the right side of the operator are the ones of the destination host. The second type of 
direction operator that can be seen on a Snort rule is <>, which indicates that the traffic 
is bidirectional. The bidirectional operator is used when there is need of recording both 
sides and can be linked with protocols such as Telnet or POP3. We should, also, men-
tion that there is no <- operator, since there is only one way of reading a Snort rule and 
it cannot be reverted.  
Regarding the Rule Options section, the elements within it can be categorized into 4 dif-
ferent divisions. The first one are the general options that offer us information related to 
the rule, however they do not affect the detection. The payload options are the ones that 
search for specific data within the packet’s payload. There are, also, the non-payload 
options that search for data other than the packet’s payload.  Finally, we have the post-
detection options, which determine are options that occur after the initiation of the 
rule’s action. Moving on, we will mention some of these options that can be found regu-
larly within a Snort rule. 
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One very common, but useful, rule option is the msg option. This option contains a 
message that will be displayed on our monitor when the rule will be triggered. 
Reference is another practical option that can be proven valuable when we have to man-
age a lot of different rules.  The reference option usually contains an id and a URL ad-
dress that leads to an external identification system, which can provide us more infor-
mation about the nature of the rule. 
Sid is an option in the form of a number that is needed by the system in order to identify 
the rules more easily and it is unique for each of them. We have to pay close attention 
when assigning a sid number to a new local rule, since up until the number 999,999 are 
reserved by Snort’s itself. So, local rules should have a sid equal to 1,000,000 or higher. 
Rev is the keyword that signifies the number of the revisions that a rule has been 
through. This keyword is very useful, since, in combination with the sid option, helps 
Snort to identify the rules and automatically update them, if any changes occur. 
Classtype is an option used in alert rules, suggesting the type of the attack that triggered 
the alert. Snort can provide us a list of some indicative classifications; however, we can 
use our own as well, after having them defined in the snort.conf file.  Classtype option 
is followed by three fields; the first one is the name of the classtype, the second is a 
brief description and finally the priority of the attack. By default, 1 signifies the highest 
severity of an attack and 4 the lowest.  
For the sake of not getting in too much details, that are not needed in the case that we 
are examining, as Snort rule options are various and fall into different categories we are 
going to mention some of the options that are heavily used and we are using in this dis-
sertation for forming the rule that detects the attack related to the EternalBlue. 
One of the most common options used in Snort rules is the flow option. Essentially it 
indicates the same thing as the direction operators, as it shows the flow of the traffic. 
When this option is followed by the keyword established, it indicates that the traffic to 
the direction mentioned is established via a TCP session. 
Depth is, also, a very useful option that follows the content option and it specifies in 
which depth the analyzer will stop searching for the content specified. For example, if 
we are having an option of depth : 5, the analyzer will stop searching after 5 bytes. In 
other words, depth is the number of the bytes that are contained within the content op-
tion. 
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The Offset option specifies from where we should start looking for a pattern within a 
packet. For example is the Offset has a value of 10, it indicates that Snort would start 
searching for the content specified after the 10 first bytes in the payload. 
We will, also, encounter the Distance option. In contradiction with the Depth option, 
Distance will inform Snort how many bytes it should ignore after the previous match 
before starting searching for the next content specified. We will get in more details in a 
practical way on the Applied Implementation later on. 
An identical option to the Distance one, is the Within option. It indicates how many 
bytes are between the previous and the next content that we want to match. 
Finally there is the fast_pattern option which indicates to Snort that once it is found it 
should speed up the matching process. In other words, if the fast_pattern option accom-
panies a content option and the content specified is not found Snort will stop examining 
the rule even further. 
 
Wireshark [15] 
 
Wireshark is one of  the most known free, open source programs used for packet analy-
sis and is written in C/C++ programming language and originally developed by Gerald 
Combs. Wireshark is very much alike Tcpdump, however  Wireshark offers to its users 
a Graphical User Interface (GUI). For the old-school users there is a terminal-based ver-
sion of Wireshark, called TShark. Wireshark is supported by the majority of the nowa-
days operating system, among them Windows, Linux and macOS.  
It is mainly used from network administrators in order to have a better idea of what is 
going on within their network or in order to analyze the traffic when it is  
necessary. It is, often, used for educational purposes as well, in order for students to 
have a better understanding of the protocols, their interaction, etc. 
Wireshark not only performs live network traffic analysis, but it gives the ability to its 
users to record the traffic monitored and save it usually in the form of PCAP files. In 
addition, it offers a great variety of filters that can be used in order to search in more 
details within a packet.  
As Snort, Wireshark uses Deep Packet Inspection for providing users the most detailed 
information concerning their network traffic. Finally, the fact that Wireshark offers de-
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cryption support for a great variety of protocols (such as WEP, WPA/WPA2 and 
SSL/TLS) makes it a dangerous tool in the hands of criminals when it comes to unse-
cure or poorly secured networks, since it can help them to gather sensitive information 
about their victims, such as passwords, credit card numbers, etc. 
 
Metasploit [16] 
 
Metasploit is a framework that aids the discovery of unsecure and vulnerable systems 
and is mainly used as a part of performing Penetration Testing. No matter the innocent 
intentions of the creators, Metasploit is, often, used for executing unauthorized actions 
in order to compromise the victim’s systems and gain access to them. 
Metasploit is written in Perl programming language by the security expert H. D. Moore 
and it made its first appearance in 2003. It provides to the users a great variety of ex-
ploits that the individual can choose and configure them appropriately in order to target 
the specific system they wish. After they are done with the configuration, Metasploit 
will check whether the victim is vulnerable to the exploit used or not. Once the target is 
found vulnerable, the user can generate a payload with the dedicated exploitation with 
the help of the software in order to gain access to it. Metasploit can, also, provide us to 
add encoding to the payloads in order to pass unnoticed by the Intrusion Detection and 
Prevention Systems. 
In this dissertation we will use the Metasploit Framework in order to exploit our target 
using the vulnerable SMB protocol, as well as, NSA tools EternalBlue and DoublePul-
sar. 
 
Nmap [17] 
 
Another tool that we are going to use in this dissertation is the Network Mapper, also 
known as Nmap. For creating Nmap, Gordon Lyon used various programming languag-
es such as C/C++ and Python and its main purpose is the discovery of hosts and the ser-
vices that are running within a specific computer network. For doing so, Nmap analyses 
the responses of the hosts after it has sent them specific crafted packets. 
-42- 
Nmap can provide us other features other than just displaying the hosts and services 
within a network. One of those, which we are going to use in this dissertation is the use 
of scripts that can give us more detailed information about the vulnerabilities that are 
linked to a specific protocol or service used by the victim and if they are applicable to 
them. It, also, provides other useful functionalities that can be proven very useful when 
it comes on gathering information regarding our target by proving the attacker the oper-
ating system of the victim, its MAC address or open ports that are vulnerable to attacks. 
There is, also, a GUI version of the Nmap, called Zenmap. 
 
Wine [18] 
 
Maybe the less known tool used in the dissertation, Wine, also known as Windows 
Emulator, is a free, open source software used in order to execute Windows applications 
on Linux or other operating systems, giving the user the ability of using the strong 
points of their current operating system but at the same time being able to run programs 
that are developed exclusively for Windows operating systems. A useful property of the 
Wine software, that we are going to take advantage on our implementation described 
below is the fact that Wine can be used in order to access remote Windows applications. 
Installing it is not a troublesome process, so it is ideal for combining the best part of two 
operating systems without having to waste any extra resources or money in acquiring 
and setting a new host. 
 
5.1.2 Hardware 
 
At this point, it will be useful to make a brief notation on the hardware used to host the 
virtual Environment that we are going to describe on section 2 of the Chapter 5.  
Starting with the laptop, the model used is ASUS X556UJ [19] with the following spe-
cifications: 
 Processor: Intel Core i7-6500U to 2.5GHz 
 Operating System: Windows 10 Home 
 Memory: 4GB DDR3L 1600MHz 
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 Graphics: NVIDIA GeForce 920M 
 Storage: 500GB HDD 
We will have to mention that, for the purpose of our needs in order to support the virtual 
machines used, we had to upgrade the initial memory of the laptop from the 4GB to 
12GB, by adding an extra 8GB RAM. 
Finally, we have to make a reference to the network cards, used. The one that will be 
used as eth0 is the re-installed wireless network card of the ASUS laptop, Qualcomm 
Atheros QCNFA335. Once more, for the purposes of our implementation we had to ac-
quire an extra, external wireless network card to be assigned as the eth1 interface. For 
choosing the external wireless network card, we had to be particularly careful since not 
all the wireless network cards are compatible with the Kali Linux operating system. Af-
ter a lot of research, we were able to acquire the TP-LINK TL-WN722N Wireless USB 
Network Card. Again, before acquiring the specific model we had to make sure of using 
the version 1.0 of the card, since some changes of the construction and the hardware of 
the wireless card implemented on version 2.0 makes it unsuitable for using it with Kali 
Linux operating system. 
5.2 Identification and Setup of the Virtual Environ-
ment  
 
Before moving on describing the hands-on method that we are going to use, it is of great 
importance to give a brief description of our virtual environment. 
To begin with, within our network, there are three different types of virtual machines. 
The first one is a Windows 7 virtual machine, named as IE8-Win7, that will play the 
role of the victim and has the following characteristics: 
 Operating System: Windows 7 Enterprise Service Pack 1 
 Architecture: 32 bits. 
 Base Memory (RAM): 1GB 
 Processor: 1CPU 
 Network Adapter: Host-only Adapter (eth1) 
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Picture 6: Command used for enabling SMB protocol on Windows 7. 
 
Except from the settings regarding the hardware aspect of the Victim’s machine, we 
have to mention that the operating system is not protected by any form of software (e.g. 
firewall, anti-virus). We had, also, to adjust the environmental variables for enabling the 
SMB protocol [20] by using the command on the PowerShell as administrator shown on 
Picture 6. 
The DWORD value set on 1 indicates the fact that the SMB protocol is activated. If the 
value was set on 0, the SMB protocol would be disabled for this machine.  
The second virtual machine is the attacker. For this purpose, we are going to use a Kali 
Linux virtual machine, named KaliLinux. The machine has the following characteris-
tics: 
 Operating System: Kali Linux 4.6.0 (Kali-Rolling) 
 Architecture: 64 bits. 
 Base Memory (RAM): 6 GB 
 Processors: 2 CPUs 
 Network Adapters: NAT (eth0) and Host-only Adapter (eth1). 
In contrast with the victim’s machine, the attacker’s machine uses two network interfac-
es, eth0 set as NAT, which serves as the management interface, and eth1 set as Host-
only Adapter, which serves as the sniffing interface. Concerning the software – related 
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needs, we have to make sure that the machine is fully updated and the followings are 
installed, updated and configured properly: 
 Eternalblue – DoublePulsar exploit for Metasploit [21]: As already mentioned 
previously these attacks are used alongside, the first one used for creating a 
backdoor to our victim’s machine and the second helps in the injection of DLL 
files by using payloads. 
 Wine: It is as a Windows Emulator used on Linux machines for running Win-
dows Applications on them. 
Finally, we have the sniffing machine. For this role, we have the Security Onion virtual 
machine, which have the following characteristics: 
 Operating System: Security Onion 14.04.5.4 
 Architecture: 64 bits. 
 Base Memory (RAM): 4 GB 
 Processors: 2 CPUs 
 Network Adapters: NAT (eth0) and Host-only Adapter (eth1). 
 
 
Picture 7: Promiscuous Mode. 
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At this point, we have to mention the fact that, under the Advanced menu, we have to 
select the “Allow All” option for the Promiscuous Mode field, as shown on Picture 
above, otherwise we will not be able to sniff the network’s traffic. 
For the Security Onion configuration, we will have to pay some extra time in order to 
make sure that is configured correctly. After, starting the machine for the first time, we 
will have to make the setup. By clicking on the Setup shortcut on the Desktop, we will 
be “welcomed” by a message that asks us if we wish to continue with configuring Secu-
rity Onion. We will click on the “Yes, Continue” button. 
The next message is related to the network configuration. We click on the “Yes, confi-
gure /etc/network/interfaces”. We need to make sure that we are setting eth0 as our 
management interface. Eth0 is linked with the NAT interface that we have set on the 
VirtualBox for Adapter 1.  
 
Picture 8: Management Interface Setting. 
 
Picture 9: DHCP Setting 
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Next, we are going to select the option of the DHCP for getting an IP address for the 
machine, as shown on Picture 9. 
After finishing with the management interface, we will move on configuring the sniff-
ing interface. We select eth1 as our sniffing interface, which is linked to the Host-only 
Adapter that we set on the VirtualBox’s settings for Adapter 2. 
 
Picture 10: Sniffing Interface Setting. 
Completing this step, as well, we will come upon a message with the finish of the con-
figuration asking us if we will like to finalize our changes. After rebooting the machine, 
we will need to make some more configurations by clicking on the Setup shortcut once 
more. This time on the message related to the network configuration, we will click the 
“Yes, skip network configuration!”. 
 
Picture 11: Stable Setup. 
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On the next message, we have to make sure that the selected setup is the Stable one, 
since it is the desirable setup for the mode that we are going to select right up next. The 
message is shown of Picture 11 above. 
Next we have to make the set up about whether we wish our system to perform under 
Production or Evaluation Mode. In our case, we will choose the Production Mode since 
it provides us a better control over the system as indicated on the picture below. 
 
Picture 12: Production Mode. 
Moving on we will select the Standalone Mode for implementing the configurations 
proposed for both the Server and the Sensors as shown on the Picture 13. Our next op-
tion will be the setting of the Best Practices option. After that we will have to choose a 
username and a password in order to have access to some of the tools that Security On-
ion provide us such as Sguil, which we are going to use, or others as ELSA or Squert. 
The password can be changed if needed via Sguil client.  
Having configured the above, we will have to choose the IDS Engine that we will like 
to use. In our case, we are going to choose Snort, as mentioned above. We will, also, 
have to choose the provider of the rules that Snort is going to download and use. We 
will choose the Emerging Threats Open option. For the RF_RING configuration, we 
will keep the default option of 4096, since our network is not considered busy, in order 
to increase the number. In any case, if there are any changes concerning the amount of 
  -49- 
the traffic in our network we can change the default value to a higher one by adjusting 
the pf_ring.conf file found in the /etc/modprobrobe.d/ directory. Next we will set eth1 
as the monitored interface and we will accept the default value that is given for the 
HOME_NET configuration.  
 
Picture 13: Standalone Mode. 
Having completed successfully the above, once more Security Onion will provide to us 
a recap of our settings and we will ask us if we want to implement the changes by click-
ing on the button “Yes, proceed with the changes!”. After clicking on the button, Secu-
rity Onion will reboot once more and after that is ready for use. 
On the following table below, we have listed the machines used, their role of each and 
their IP addresses. 
 
Machine Role IP Address 
IE8 Windows 7 Victim 192.168.2.101 
KaliLinux Attacker 
192.168.2.103 
/192.168.2.104 
SecurityOnion Lab Sniffer – IDS  192.168.2.102 
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At this point we have to mention that, at the pictures provided later on, as well on the 
table above, we will see that the attacker has two different IP addresses. That occurred 
due to network instability during the methodology testing and the attacker’s machine 
was assigned with a different IP address. 
5.3 Applied Implementation 
[22],[23]
 
 
For the purpose of the dissertation, we had to come up with a potential threat in order to 
design the attack, which will infect our victim machine. We thought of the pair threats 
of EternalBlue and DoublePulsar, the ones used in the case of the WannaCry incident, 
an incident that gained the spotlight publicly and proved for once more that even a sim-
ple ransomware can strike the most valuable aspects of the cybersecurity, such as avail-
ability of systems and information.  
Before moving to the detailed methodology used, it will be beneficial to examine in 
more details what is the idea behind the EternalBlue and DoublePulsar threats. Eternal-
Blue became famous as Server Message Block (SMB) protocol vulnerability. Although 
well-known for a big period of time to the U.S National Security Agent (NSA), it 
reached its publicity after leaked by the notorious hacker group Shadow Brokers on 
2017. After the exploit became publicly known, it was used for delivering a number of 
attacks world-widely, among them the WannaCry and NotPetya cyberattacks. Last but 
not least, it was stated that EternalBlue exploit was, also, part of spreading the banking 
trojan Retefe. EternalBlue can be found on the Common Vulnerability and Exposures 
database under the ID CVE-2017-0144. According to them, the exploit targets all the 
Windows versions starting from Windows XP and latest, as well as Windows Server 
2008, 2012 and 2016. 
DoublePulsar, on the other hand, is a backdoor tool, developed by NSA and leaked by 
Shadow Brokers. The malware is a Windows-based threat that served as a cyber spying 
tool. As already mentioned, the malware works in combo with EternalBlue exploit and 
it is delivered by abusing the TCP port 445, which is, also, the default port for the SMB 
protocol. Except from the SMB protocol, DoublePulsar, apart from the SMB protocol, 
can use another exploit related to the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to spread itself, 
this time from the TCP and UDP port 3389. The payload that DoublePulsar makes use 
of can be thought as actually being considerably large. The size of the payload has its 
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origin to the need of the malware knowing the architecture of the victim’s machine in 
order to perform a successful attack, as we are going to demonstrate to the attack that 
we will perform as well. Although, the morphology of both architecture payloads (x86 
and x64) is almost identical, using the wrong payload will result in an unsuccessful at-
tack attempt. Later on the process that we follow, we are going to see how by sniffing 
and recording the traffic, with tools such as Wireshark and TCP Dump, we can monitor 
the abnormal behavior the malware causes to the network. The great danger with this 
malware is the fact that it offers a high level of flexibility to the attackers once it is es-
tablished within the system. It has been, also, reported that it is very difficult to get rid 
of it from the infected machines. It is capable of performing a triplet of actions, which is 
the source of the high level of control that is offered to the intruders. This commands 
are the ping, kill and exec, with the latest of them being extra critical, because it can be 
used for executing new malicious components in order to infect even further the target. 
Now that we have a good understanding of the threats, we are going to use it is time for 
starting the enumeration of the attacks’ steps. 
Before generating our attack, we will have to set Security Onion in order to record the 
attack that we will perform and monitor the traffic for seeing what kind of alerts will be 
generated during the attack. For doing so, we will have to make Wireshark record the 
traffic of both eth0 and eth1. We will, also, launch Sguil, which will monitor all the in-
terfaces for displaying potential alerts and their corresponding information. 
First of all, we have to install the Wine software to our Kali Linux machine. Wine will 
help us with performing our attack, otherwise, apart from our Kali Linux attack ma-
chine, we will had to have a Windows machine acting as an attacker, which is not very 
comfortable, if we think that the Kali Linux operating system can provide us a variety 
of pre-installed tools. For installing the Wine Emulator we will have to open a terminal 
and use the command as shown to the picture below. 
Since we have already installed and updated to the latest version our Wine Emulator, 
the expected output on the terminal will look something like the below. 
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Picture 14: Wine Installation. 
After having installed the emulator, we will have to scan the network for discovering 
our target and the services that they use. More specifically, since we have chosen the 
type of the attacks that we are going to use, we can make use of more advanced options 
in order to get more precise information regarding the potential targets. The command 
that we are going to use this time is the following on Picture 15. 
 
Picture 15: Nmap Command. 
 
As it can be well-understood, we use the Nmap tool, which will scan the 192.168.2.0/24 
network range, searching for open 445 ports that can be linked with the SMB vulnera-
bility. With the --script option we tell the Nmap scanner to provide us any information 
on the SMB vulnerability that can be used on the victim, when it will find an open SMB 
port. The outcome on our terminal, once Nmap has finished scanning the whole network 
range that we defined is the one on the picture below. 
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Picture 16: Nmap Outcome. 
The Nmap come up with a potential target that uses the IP address 192.168.2.101. The 
445 port on this machine is open and we can understand that our target is a Windows 
Virtual Machine (we can conclude that our target is a virtual machine from the MAC 
address that we get back). Also, since it found an open SMB port, the next thing that it 
will provide us is the different vulnerabilities that are related with the SMB protocol and 
if they are applicable on the target. In our case, the vulnerability that can be used to this 
specific target is the CVE-2009-3103, vulnerability found on the SMB version 2. There 
are two more vulnerabilities, the MS-10-054 and MS-10-061, however, Nmap suggests 
that they cannot be used in order to compromise the machine. At that point, we have 
gathered some useful information for the victim; however, we also need to have a more 
clear view of the Windows Operating System that the victim runs. We will use Nmap, 
once more with the following command. 
 
Picture 17: Nmap Command for OS detection. 
 
-54- 
The command will help us determine the operating system that the host on the 
192.168.2.101 uses. The outcome is the following: 
 
 
Picture 18: OS Detection Outcome. 
Nmap informs us that the targeted operating system is either Windows 7/8 or Windows 
Server 2008, helping us to exclude other types of Windows versions, which are affected 
equally by this vulnerability. 
To sum up, using the Nmap, we were able of detecting a target with an open 445 port, 
vulnerable to the CVE-2009-3103, running either Windows 7/8 or Windows Server 
2008 OS with the IP address 192.168.2.101. All of these characteristics will help us to 
launch our attack. 
So, for moving to the attack, we will need to start the Metasploit Framework. Before 
that, however, we will have to start the database with the components need for the Me-
tasploit Framework by using the service psotgresql start command as shown below. 
 
Picture 19: Starting Metasploit Framework. 
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As we have already mentioned we will use the exploits related with the EternalBlue and 
the DoublePulsar. Below we can see, the exploit used and the options that we have to 
set in order to prepare our payload.  
 
Picture 20: Options needed for EternalBlue and Doublepulsar. 
 
First of all, we will need to set the path directories for both the EternalBlue and Double-
pulsar as seen on the following picture. 
 
Picture 21: Setting the path for EternalBlue and DoublePulsar. 
If we take a look at the paths that we have set, within the deps folder we will find many 
dll and exe files that are used in order launch the attack. This exe files as well as the 
PROCESSINJECT option that we will set later on, are the reasons why we had to install 
the Wine Emulator at the beginning of the process. 
Next, we are going to set the rest of the needed options.  We will need to define the 
name of the process, which will be injected into the victim under the option of the 
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PROCESSINJECT. Also, we will have to set the target’s IP address, as well as, the tar-
get’s system architecture. Under the option EXPLOIT TARGET, we will have to define 
the operating system of the victim’s machine. Last but not least, we will have to set the 
PAYLOAD that will be used as well as the IP address of our attacker’s machine in or-
der to create the reverse shell, for gaining remote access to victim side.. 
 
Picture 22: Setting the rest of the parameters needed. 
 
 
Picture 23: Outcome of successful Exploit. 
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After we have set the parameters needed as shown to the Picture 22, we are ready to ex-
ploit the target by typing on our Metasploit terminal exploit. Our terminal now displays 
us the above shown on Picture 23, if the above steps were followed correctly. 
We can see the steps that are performed with the help of the Metasploit Framework and 
the settings we have done. First of all, XML data will be generated for both of the vul-
nerabilities. After that, Metasploit will create a DLL file that will be used as the Doub-
lePulsar’s payload. Metasploit, finally, will launch both EternalBlue and DoublePulsar 
and it will notify us regarding the outcome of the exploitation. In our case, the exploita-
tion was successful and we can perform the followings shown on the picture in order to 
confirm it and we can, also, start the shell to access remotely our victim’s machine. 
 
Picture 24: Starting the shell to gain remote access. 
 
 
Picture 25: Processes running on the Victim’s side. 
Now, if we take a look at the victim’s process, we will encounter a well-known element. 
For displaying the process that are running on the victim’s machine, we will need to 
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open a command line, type PowerShell and next get-process. Our terminal will display 
an outcome like the one on the Picture 25. 
Within the processes that are running on the Windows 7 machine, we can see a process 
under the name explorer. This is the process that we generating using the Metasploitable 
Framework when we set the option INJECTPROCESS on the previous steps. Once the 
attack was successful, we can check on the sniffing machine the outcomes of the Sguil, 
that was monitoring the interfaces the whole time. The alerts that were triggered during 
the process are the ones shown on the picture below. 
 
Picture 26: Alerts generated by the attack launched. 
As we can see, there are several alerts related to the SMB protocol, however none of 
them provide us any further information about the alerts being linked to the EternalBlue 
or DoublePulsar exploits. For that reason, we are going to search the PCAP file record-
ed by Wireshark, in order to collect more information and identify the attack’s pattern in 
order to be able to establish our own Snort rule using RegEx, so that the attack could be 
successfully identified by Sguil. 
Knowing that the EternalBlue and DoublePulsar are taking advantage of the SMB pro-
tocol, we are going to filter the PCAP file in order to examine it easier. After taking a 
careful look at the outcomes of the filtering, we notice that there is a suspicious repeti-
tion of malformed SMB packets. By examining the Reassembled TCP data on picture 
27, we can observe that there is a pattern that we can take advantage in order to write 
the Snort rule. 
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Picture 27: Apply SMB filter on Wireshark. 
The first of these elements is the long sequence of 25 bytes, which includes the word 
SMB that will serve as our first content for the rule. Right after this, there is, also, a se-
quence of bytes seen on every malformed SMB packet that can be useful for detecting 
this certain behavior. Lastly, when it comes to the mutual elements of the malformed 
packets, we identify a third useful sequence of bytes for constructing the rule.  
 
Picture 28: Elements used for assembling Snort rule. 
 
There is a forth pattern at the end of each packet; however it is not as clear as the rest of 
the patterns, in the sense that we have to figure out a way of using it efficiently and ef-
fectively. Here is where Regular Expressions can come in handy. Even though the con-
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tent of the fourth element is not the same for all the malformed packets, we can use a 
Regular Expression that will search for a match of a combination that will start with up-
per-case and lower-case letters, as well as digits from 0 to 9 and we will, also, use a 
quantifier, since for each malformed packet the expression is repeated multiple times. 
On Picture 28, there is a sample of the elements that guide as in order to assemble the 
Snort rule. 
Regarding the Regular Expression, its format will be this one along with each symbol 
explanation: 
/^[a-zA-Z0-9+/]{500, }/R 
 
^: Starts the match from the beginning of the string. 
[ ]: Matches every element contained on the square brackets. 
a-z: Matches every lower-case letter. 
A-Z: Matches every upper-case letter. 
0-9: Matches every digit. 
+ and /: Matches with + or / symbol. 
{500, }: Matches the pattern within the curly brackets 500 or more times. 
/…/R: This is a Snort Regular Expression flag, which is equal of using the option dis-
tance:0 
 
Having found the main elements of our rule will can move on writing it. Since, it is a 
“homemade” rule, we will have to contain the rule in the local.rule file found in the 
/etc/nsm/rules directory. In order to edit the file, we will need to have root rights and for 
that reason we have to use the command sudo –s. 
 
Picture 29: Snort rule for EternalBlue. 
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From the above described and using the Snort Rule Options described on Chapter 5.1.1, 
our rule is the one shown on Picture 29. 
Before putting it into test, we will have to update the rules used by Snort in order for our 
rule to be valid. This will be done by using the command sudo rule-update. After Bar-
nyard2 and Snort have been restarted successfully, we can use the following command 
on Picture 30, for replaying the attack that we used previously. 
 
 
Picture 30: Tcpreplay command. 
This command essentially is telling Tcpreplay to replay the PCAP file found on this 
specific directory at full speed (-t) at the interface eth1 (-i eth1) and replay it one time (-
l 1). After the replay has finished, the output on the Sguil environment is the one shown 
on the Picture 31. 
 
 
Picture 31: Alerts shown on the Sguil Environment with the rule using RegEx. 
For checking that we have captured correctly the malformed packet, we are going to use 
as a filter on Wireshark the ID number shown on the Packet Data field from Sguil. The 
result is shown on the Picture 32. 
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Picture 32: Checking the accuracy of the Snort rule. 
As we can see above, the packet was detected successfully and it contains all the ele-
ments that we used on our Snort rule. Now, we are going to test the effectiveness of the 
rule without the usage of the Regular Expressions. Once again, we are going to edit the 
local.rule file and update the rules in order to submit the changes to the system. This 
time the rule will be like the one displayed on Picture 33. 
 
 
Picture 33: Snort rule without Regular Expressions. 
Having applied the changes, we replay the PCAP file in order to check the outcome on 
Sguil, exactly as we did the previous time for testing the rule with the Regular Expres-
sion. The outcome is shown on Picture 34. 
We cannot help but notice that the alerts linked to the rule that we have constructed are 
significantly more than when the rule was using the Regular Expressions. Anew, we are 
going to use the ID from the Packet Data field on Sguil as a filter to the Wireshark re-
cording in order to check what kind of packet is associated with the alert. 
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Picture 34: Alerts triggered after modifying the Snort rule. 
We can see on Picture 35 that the rule did not have as a result the same packet as pre-
viously. In fact, it detected a TCP packet, which it cannot help us understand as clearly 
as previously why the alert was generated. By following this methodology, it is clearly 
understood the usefulness of the Regular Expressions when it comes in the optimization 
of intrusion detection systems performance, as they can provide to the administrators a 
more precise view of the events without having to cope with long lists of alerts that will 
cause confusion in figuring out the origins of them, especially when the administrators 
have to deal with a lot of traffic within the monitored network. 
 
Picture 35: Outcome in Wireshark without Regular Expressions on Snort rule. 
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6 Conclusions 
Nowadays, the security of Information Systems and Networks is more essential than 
ever before. Every day more and more threats emerge using more advanced and stealthy 
techniques, in order to bypass the basic security measures such as firewalls and anti-
virus. An additional measure in order to harden our systems and protect them efficient is 
the deployment of the appropriate Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS). 
There are different types of IDPSs suitable for various types of networks and addressing 
different kinds of threats. An administrator has to have a solid view of the network and 
order to recognize its need and vulnerabilities, so that they would be able to choose the 
right type of IDPS and apply the proper architecture. In this way, the IDPS will work at 
the highest of its possibilities and will not slow down or disrupt the functionality of the 
network. 
However, as mentioned previously, IDPSs by themselves are not a silver bullet. They 
need the appropriate tuning and configuration, or otherwise, there is the danger of our 
system producing a lot of false negative and false positive alerts. Apart from the tuning 
and the configuration, IDPSs should be combined with the needed techniques in order 
to enhance their performance and effectiveness without consuming an unbearable 
amount of the network’s resource. 
In the current dissertation, we wanted to point out the positive aspects that Deep Packet 
Inspection and Regular Expressions that can offer, when used correctly, by Intrusion 
Detection and Prevention Systems.  
Deep Packet Inspection is the highest of the Packet Inspection Levels that is used when 
the administrators are in need of a detailed view of their network, as this technique pro-
vides them details about all the OSI layers thoroughly. This technique is used by a va-
riety of security programs. We choose Snort and Wireshark, the first one for examining 
in details the packets that are coming and going to our network, without missing any 
packets and Wireshark that helped as to record all the traffic associated to our network, 
so that we will be able to analyze, identify the malicious behavior that we generated and 
construct the need rule in order to be detectable in the future. 
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The Regular Expression technique used by Snort, will give as an additional tool for 
making the Snort rules more effective and precise, helping the administrator understand 
in time and much more effortless what is going on when an alert occurs, especially 
when the traffic is heavy and there are various alerts, in need of being examined. 
In order to put in test our implementation and prove that Deep Packet Inspection and 
Regular Expressions can be beneficial when combined with Intrusion Detection Sys-
tems, we had to come up with a use case scenario. We selected the EternalBlue and 
DoublePulsar vulnerabilities for that purpose, which both of them take advantage of the 
SMB protocol. We, also, had to set up an virtual environment that contained three dif-
ferent types of machines, a Windows 7 machine, a Security Onion machine (Ubuntu-
based Operating System) and a Kali Linux (Debian-based Operating System). Each of 
them is used for different objectives. The Windows 7 machine is assigned to play the 
role of the victim, the Security Onion machine the role of the sniffing machine and Kali 
Linux the role of the attacker. The goal of this implementation is to launch an Eternal-
Blue – DoublePulsar attack using Kali Linux to the Windows machine, see how the 
sniffing machine will response in terms of detecting it and use the recording of the net-
work traffic in order to observe the right elements and write the Snort rule of detecting 
the attack more efficiently in the future. 
The outcome of the present dissertation was that using Deep Packet Inspection and 
Regular Expressions carefully, we can construct rules that are more precise that the 
rules using exclusively exact match content, as they reduce the amount of alerts to the 
ones that are truly needed and provide a more accurate view of the situation, helping the 
administrator monitoring the network to act in time and perform the right action of de-
fending against the attack. 
To sum up, in the initial scope of the dissertation was to write two different Snort rules, 
one for each of the vulnerabilities used. We were able to identify the elements related to 
the EternalBlue vulnerability and construct a decent and functional rule that has tested 
for its effectiveness for both using Regular Expressions and Exact Match Content. Due 
to the limited time, we were not able of doing the same for the DoublePulsar vulnerabil-
ity and that can be considered as a future expansion of the present work. 
 
 
 
  -67- 
Bibliography 
[1] Ted Holland, SANS Institute, Understanding IPS and IDS: Using IPS and IDS to-
gether for Defense in Depth, February 23, 2004 [available at:  
https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/detection/understanding-ips-ids-ips-
ids-defense-in-depth-1381] 
[2] Guy Bruneau, SANS Institute, The History and Evolution of Intrusion Detection, 
2001 [available at: https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/detection/history-
evolution-intrusion-detection-344] 
[3] Girish M. Wandhare, S. N. Gujar and V. M. Thakare, International Journal for 
Scientific Research & Development, A Survey on DPI Techniques for Regular Expres-
sion Detection in Network Intrusion Detection System, 2014 
[4] S.Prithi, S. Sumathi and C. Amuthavalli, International Journal of Electronics, Elec-
trical and Computational System, A Survey on Intrusion Detection System using Deep 
Packet Inspection for Regular Expression Matching, January, 2017 
[5] A. Munoz, S. Sezer, D. Burns and G. Douglas, 2011 IEEE International Conference 
on Communications (ICC), An Approach for Unifying Rule Based Deep Packet Inspec-
tion, 2011 
[6] Yi Wang, International Journal of Security and Its Applications, Research on Net-
work Intrusion Detection Method based on Regular Expression Matching, 2016 [availa-
ble at: http://www.sersc.org/journals/IJSIA/vol10_no7_2016/16.pdf] 
[7] Karen Scarfone and Peter Mell, National Institute of Standard and Technology 
(NIST), Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS), February 2007 [ 
available at: http://ws680.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=50951] 
[8] International Telecommunication Union (ITU), White Paper on Deep Packet Inspec-
tion [available at: http://tec.gov.in/pdf/Studypaper/White%20paper%20on%20DPI.pdf] 
[9] Christopher Parsons, Surveillance Studies Centre, Deep Packet Inspection in Pers-
pective: Tracing its lineage and surveillance potentials, January 10, 2008 [available at:  
http://www.sscqueens.org/sites/default/files/WP_Deep_Packet_Inspection_Parsons_Jan
_2008.pdf ] 
-68- 
[10] Jeffrey Friedl, O’Reilly Media, Mastering Regular Expressions 3rd Edition, June, 
2009 
[11]Doug Burks, Security Onion Wiki, February 18, 2017 [available at: 
https://github.com/Security-Onion-Solutions/security-onion/wiki] 
[12] Bamm Visscher, Sguil: The Analyst Console for Network Security Monitoring 
[available at: https://bammv.github.io/sguil/index.html] 
[13] Sguil FAQ [available at: http://nsmwiki.org/Sguil_FAQ] 
[14] The Snort Project, SNORT Users Manual 2.9.11, August 31, 2017 [available at: 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/snort-org-
site/production/document_files/files/000/000/129/original/snort_manual.pdf] 
[15] Ulf Lamping, Richard Sharpe and Ed Warnicke, Wireshark User’s Guide for Wire-
shark 2.5 [available at: https://www.wireshark.org/download/docs/user-guide.pdf] 
[16]Metasploit Framework User Guide Version 3.1 [available at: 
http://cs.uccs.edu/~cs591/metasploit/users_guide3_1.pdf] 
[17] Gordon “Fyodor” Lyon, The Nmap Project, Documentation and Nmap Reference 
Guide [available at: https://nmap.org/docs.html] 
[18]Wine FAQ and Documentation [available at: 
https://wiki.winehq.org/FAQ#Who_is_responsible_for_Wine.3F 
https://www.winehq.org/documentation] 
[19]ASUS ASUS X556UJ Specifications [available at: 
https://www.asus.com/Laptops/X556UJ/specifications/] 
[20] Microsoft Support, How to detect, enable and disable SMBv1, SNBv2, and SMBv3 
in Windows and Windows Server [available at: https://support.microsoft.com/en-
us/help/2696547/how-to-detect-enable-and-disable-smbv1-smbv2-and-smbv3-in-
windows-and] 
[21]ElevenPaths, Eternalblue-Doublepulsar-Metasploit [available at: 
https://github.com/ElevenPaths/Eternalblue-Doublepulsar-Metasploit] 
[22] Symantec, Backdoor.Doublepulsar Technical Details, April 21, 2017 [available at: 
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2017-042122-0603-
99&tabid=2] 
  -69- 
[23] Nadav Grossman,Check Point Research, EternalBlue – Everything There Is To 
Know, September 29, 2017 [available at: https://research.checkpoint.com/eternalblue-
everything-know/] 
